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Abstract 
Sensors are tiny, resource-limited devices that are deployed in different areas to 
gather information for specific purposes. Wireless sensor networks consist of sensors 
with limited communication range and one or more sink nodes that are responsible for 
collecting the produced data by the sensors. Mobile wireless sensor networks is a 
subdomain of wireless sensor networks in which sensors and/or sinks are mobile. 
Trajectory privacy of the sink node is one of the security issues that are emerged with 
mobile wireless sensor networks. In this thesis, we propose a scheme for the trajectory 
privacy of mobile sink nodes. The proposed scheme is based on random distribution of 
data packets. In this scheme, sensor nodes do not use and need location information of 
the mobile sink or its trajectory. We performed simulation based and analytical 
performance evaluations for the proposed scheme. The results show that a network with 
up to 99% data delivery rate can be obtained by appropriate configuration of the scheme 
parameters while maintaining the trajectory privacy of the mobile sink node. In addition 
to that, the proposed scheme has economical resource usage since it does not involve 
any kind of cryptographic mechanism.  
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HAREKETLĠ KABLOSUZ DUYARGA AĞLARINDA YÖRÜNGE 
GĠZLĠLĠĞĠNĠ SAĞLAMA 
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Bilgisayar Bilimi ve Mühendisliği, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2012 
Tez Danışmanı: Doç. Dr. Albert Levi 
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Özet 
Duyargalar küçük, amacına göre çeşitli alanlara dağıtılmış, sınırlı kaynağa sahip 
belirli amaçlar için bilgi toplayan cihazlardır. Telsiz duyarga ağları; sınırlı iletişim 
alanına sahip duyargalar ve duyargaların ürettiği bilgileri toplamakla sorumlu alıcı 
düğümden oluşur. Hareketli telsiz duyarga ağları ise hareket kabiliyetine sahip 
bileşenlerinden dolayı telsiz duyarga ağlarının alt alanıdır. Alıcı düğümün yörünge 
güvenliği hareketli telsiz duyarga ağları için ortaya çıkan güvenlik sorunlarından biridir. 
Bu tezde, telsiz duyarga ağlarında alıcı düğümün yörünge güvenliği için şema 
önerilmektedir. Önerilen şemanın temeli veri paketlerinin rastgele dağıtımına 
dayanmaktadır. Bu şemada, duyarga düğümleri hareketli alıcı düğümün yeri veya 
yörüngesi bilgisine ihtiyaç duymazlar. Önerilen şema için, simulasyona dayalı ve 
çözümlemeler içeren başarım değerlendirmesi gerçekleştirdik. Sonuçlar göstermiştir ki 
hareketli alıcı düğümün yörünge güvenliği sağlanırken uygun iletişim kuralları 
değişkenleri seçildiği takdirde %99’a varan veri iletimi başarı yüzdesine sahip ağ elde 
edilebilir. Buna ek olarak, önerilen iletişim kuralları her hangi bir şifreleme 
mekanizması içermediği için hesaplı kaynak kullanımına sahiptir. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [1] have emerged as a new generation of 
distributed embedded systems that provide observations on the physical world at low cost 
and with high accuracy. A wireless sensor network consists of a large number of tiny, low-
powered, energy-constrained smart sensor nodes with sensing, data processing and 
wireless communication components. Sensor nodes in WSNs are small battery powered 
devices with limited energy resources, and their batteries cannot be recharged once the 
sensor nodes are deployed. WSNs have become an exciting research and development area 
[2] in the last decade and can be used in many various applications, including battlefield 
surveillance, harbor monitoring, healthcare, etc.  
In spite of serving solutions such as monitoring wide areas with easy deployment, 
WSNs suffer from the following drawbacks [3]: 
 Near-sink sensors drain energy faster than the other sensors in the network since 
near-sink sensors does not only need to deliver their own data packets, but also 
should forward data packets originated from the other sensors. As a result, the 
near-sink sensor rapidly falls out of function and this disables the functionality 
of the entire network. 
 Due to the abovementioned reason, near-sink sensors produce high network 
traffic. This permits attackers, as mentioned in [8],  benefit from network traffic 
analysis for exposing location of sink nodes. 
 It may not be feasible to deploy a fixed sink in areas such as battle fields, 
volcanic areas, underwater zones, etc. 
 Deployment in the abovementioned areas creates coverage uncertainty.  
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In a relative study, Di Pietro et. al. [4]  states that Mobile Wireless Sensor Networks 
(MWSNs) is an alternative to traditional WSNs. MWSNs may be used for overcoming 
some handicaps of WSNs such as coverage uncertainty. If, for instance, sensors are 
mobile, they can move toward uncovered area of the network after deployment. The 
advances in robotics and wireless communication technologies have enabled the 
development of new architectures for MWSNs which have drawn considerable attention 
from the research community in the last decade [3].  
The network architectures of MWSNs are classified into three categories.  
 Static sensor nodes with mobile sink: Sensors are static and one or more mobile 
collectors periodically visit the deployed area for collection. An example for 
this kind of network architecture would be sensors that are deployed in a 
volcanic area and a helicopter as the mobile collector responsible for 
periodically collecting the data. 
 Static sink with mobile sensor nodes: Sensors are mobile and one or more static 
collectors collect the sensed data when the mobile sensor node falls into the 
transmission range. Animal with the attached sensors and the sink nodes at the 
places where animals frequently visit is an example of this kind of network 
architecture. 
 Mobile sink with mobile sensor nodes: Both sensors and sink(s) are mobile. 
Sensors, with capability of controlling depth of their position, deployed 
underwater and a few unmanned submarines periodically visit the deployed area 
for collection of the data is an example for mobile sink with mobile sensor 
nodes network architecture [5].  
MWSNs have their own unique properties such as having dynamic mobile network 
topology. Since sensor and sink nodes are not always in direct communication, sensor 
nodes should have the data storage capability.  These unique properties have brought many 
new security challenges. As mentioned in [1], [2], [3], [4], [5] [8] and [9], approaches for 
general network security issues cannot be applied to the WSNs due to the special 
characteristics of WSNs. Ren et. al [25] states that the unique properties of MWSNs also 
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prevents the implementation of traditional computer security approaches which are 
applicable to security issues of static WSNs. 
As having mobile sink is part of some network architectures of MWSNs, it is also a 
key player for the applications that are built on these architectures. For some applications, 
the owner and the user of the network would be different. For instance, a set of sensors can 
be deployed on oceanic area in order to collect data about the geographical properties. The 
users of this network would be oil companies with their own mobile collectors. Since these 
companies are competitors, they would be interested in each other’s data collection region. 
Therefore, the location privacy of the collectors of mobile companies is a security concern. 
Drastically, the network could be a military one and the mobile collector could be a 
soldier. The interest of the attacker would be not only the current location of mobile sink, 
but also the patrolling trajectory. Thus, the trajectory of the mobile sink is a new security 
challenge emerged with MWSNs. 
 
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one work[19] addressing the topic of 
protecting location privacy of a mobile sink. Again to the best of our knowledge, there is 
no work in the literature addressing the problem of protecting trajectory privacy of a 
mobile sink. 
1.1. Contribution of the Thesis 
In this thesis, we propose a scheme to maintain trajectory privacy of mobile sink(s) 
for mobile wireless sensor networks with mobile sink and mobile sensor nodes network 
architecture. Our literature search suggests that our work is the first one in the literature 
addressing the concern of trajectory privacy of mobile sinks. Our scheme relies on 
homogeneously distributing the sensed data through the network. The proposed scheme 
does not change the actions of sensor nodes in the infinite unattendance of the mobile sink 
4 
 
or in the constant attendance of the mobile sink. Therefore, traffic analysis does not give 
any information about the mobile sink’s location and trajectory.  
Since our scheme excludes the location of the mobile sink in the header of packets, 
it does not require any cryptographic functionality for maintaining trajectory privacy of the 
mobile sink. This makes our proposal lightweight in terms of memory and computational 
power. Our performance evaluation shows that our scheme supplies high data delivery rate 
(up to 99% for certain configurations).  
1.2. Organization of the Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 gives general background 
information on location privacy approaches in wireless sensor networks and presents 
existing solutions in the literature. In Section 3, details of the proposed scheme are 
explained. Section 4 presents the performance evaluation of the proposed scheme. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes the thesis.  
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2. BACKGROUND ON LOCATION PRIVACY IN WIRELESS SENSOR 
NETWORKS 
WSNs are deployed in unattended areas and due to the motivation of applications 
of WSNs such as battlefield surveillance, location privacy of sensor nodes and sink node(s) 
are important security concerns. In this section, due to the lack of research on the trajectory 
privacy of sink nodes in MWSNs, we will present general background on location privacy 
in WSNs. Location privacy concern in MWSNs is classified into two categories: (i) 
location privacy of sensor nodes, (ii) location privacy of sink node(s). 
2.1. Location Privacy of Sensor Nodes 
In [6], “Panda Hunter Game” is proposed for modeling the location privacy 
concern of sensor nodes. In the Panda-Hunter Game, panda-detection sensor nodes have 
been deployed by the Save-The-Panda Organization to monitor a vast habitat for pandas 
[7]. As soon as a panda is observed, the corresponding sensor node makes observations, 
and sends this message towards the base station via multi-hop routing techniques. 
Meanwhile, due to the open nature of WSNs, an armed panda hunter may overhear the 
message. The hunter, by back-tracing the routing path, can find out the location of the 
sensor that generates the message of panda location. 
 
In [6], Random-Walk Routing scheme is proposed for protecting the location 
privacy of the sensor nodes where the sensors have the mobility capability. The idea is that 
sensors randomly move for a certain amount of time or distance and then forward the 
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message.  If an attacker back traces the forwarded packet, she will only be able to find out 
an intermediate node’s location.  Due to the energy limitations of the sensor nodes, it is not 
feasible to let source node to make a long distance random walk. Thus, if the attacker is not 
interested in exact location of the source node, but the region of it, the random-walk 
scheme does not succeed. In addition to that, this kind of approach is still vulnerable to the 
location privacy concern of sink node(s). 
 
Dummy data injection is another technique proposed for protection of the location 
of sensor node [15]. The idea is letting the sensor nodes to distribute dummy data packets 
in predetermined time intervals or with a predetermined probability. This technique also 
relies on the perturbation of network traffic which increases the communication overhead 
and it still does not prevent the high traffic rate at near-sink sensor nodes. 
  
The proposed technique in [30], Fake Data Source, is similar to the dummy data 
injection. Here instead, predetermined nodes behave as the data source and distribute fake 
data packets at the same time interval of distribution of real data packets. This method also 
enforces the attacker to make more analysis and computation but still does not provide an 
appropriate privacy for the location of the sensor nodes. In addition to that, the high energy 
consumption and communication overhead are also handicaps of this technique. 
2.2. Location Privacy of Sink Node(s) 
 The location privacy of the sink node(s) can be motivated with such an example: 
movement-detection sensor nodes are deployed in an area to analyze activities of enemies 
and movement of troops. One or more sinks which are attached to a soldier are used to 
access the sensed data by sensor nodes. The exposition of the location of sink (and soldier) 
puts the life of soldier in danger, and also may reveal the entire network’s secrets since the 
sink node may hold the authentication keys and pairwise keys of the network. 
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The traffic-analysis attack for tracing the location of sink node is introduced and 
studied in [8].  Based on the basic observation, near-sink nodes forward more packets than 
the sensors further away from the sink. An adversary can analyze network traffic intensity 
at various locations. This analysis may help adversary to estimate the direction of the sink 
because denser network traffic may mean the location is closer to the sink. The packet-
tracing attack for tracing the location of sensor nodes is addressed in [6].  The attack is 
performed by eavesdropping on the traffic. The adversary is able to perform a hop-by-hop 
trace toward the original data source.  
 
Flooding-Based Routing scheme is studied in [9, 10, 11, 12, and 13] as a counter 
measure for the traffic-analysis attack. Each intermediate node broadcasts the received 
message to its neighbors. As a result, the entire network participates in forwarding one 
single message to the sink node(s). This approach hardens the traffic analysis for an 
adversary to trace transmission route back to the sink node. In [14, 15], a minor 
modification of flooding-based routing scheme (called as Probabilistic flooding) is 
proposed for overcoming the extreme energy consumption of flooding-based routing 
schemes. In probabilistic flooding, broadcasting the received message to its neighbors is 
limited with a probability. An intermediate node forwards with a predetermined probability 
(here, if the predetermined probability equals to 1, it is actually the implementation of 
flooding-based routing scheme). Despite that all the proposed schemes based on flooding 
perturb the expected network traffic analysis, they still suffer from not preventing the 
observable high traffic rate at near-sink sensor nodes and cause extreme communication 
overhead. 
 
In [6], phantom routing is proposed as a more powerful scheme than the 
abovementioned techniques. They study the variations of flooding-based and single-path 
routing techniques and claim that none of these schemes provide location privacy of sink 
node. In phantom routing, the delivery of each message experiences two phases: (1) the 
random walk phase, which may be a pure random walk or a directed walk, meant to direct 
the message to a phantom source, and (2) a subsequent flooding/single-path routing stage, 
meant to deliver the message to the sink. When the source sensor node generates a 
message, the message is unicasted in a random fashion for a predetermined number of 
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hops. After the hops, in phantom flooding phase the message is flooded using baseline 
(probabilistic) flooding. With the technique, various routes are produced along one single 
sensor node to the sink node, which hardens the analysis of an attacker. Although the 
simulation results have yielded better results according to the previous approaches, 
phantom routing also suffers from not preventing the observable high traffic rate at near-
sink nodes and it increases the communication overhead.  
 
In [17], Location-Privacy Routing protocol is proposed for the location privacy of 
the static sink node(s). The scheme allows sensor nodes to select routing paths randomly 
based on a predetermined probability. Each sensor node’s neighbors are divided into two 
lists: (i) the ones with longer route to the sink node, and (ii) the ones with shorter route to 
the sink node. When a sensor generates a data packet, it forwards the packet through longer 
route neighbors with a predetermined probability. Otherwise, it forwards the packet 
through shorter route neighbors. Although this approach generates various routes along to 
the sink node, each route will end up around the near-sink sensor nodes. Thus, both 
network traffic analysis and trace routing would be successful attack methods for exposing 
the location of sink node. 
 
In [18], Controlling Transmission Rate technique is proposed for keeping the same 
transmission rate among all sensors by controlling delay of actual data packets. Since the 
asymmetric traffic flow enables an attacker to observe higher network traffic at near sink 
sensor nodes, with this scheme the amount of traffic per unit time is aimed to be controlled. 
However, a global attacker may still have the capability of observing the number of 
packets that are received and forwarded. Thus, even though the transmission rate of near-
sink sensor nodes stays at normal values, the volume of packets that they deal with is still 
important information for an attacker to find out the location of sink node(s). 
 
In [19], a randomized routing scheme is proposed in order to maintain location 
privacy of sink node for MWSNs with mobile sinks. Packets are forwarded for a 
predetermined number of hops along a random path and the destination field is not 
included in the header of the packets. Each intermediate sensor node stores the received 
packet in its buffer and forwards it if the predetermined hop count is not reached. Since 
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there is no information about the sink nodes in the forwarded packets, location privacy is 
maintained. However, to be able to have high delivery rate, predetermined hop count 
should be selected large, which in turn causes higher network traffic. 
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3. THE PROPOSED SCHEME FOR MAINTAINING TRAJECTORY PRIVACY 
OF MOBILE SINK 
In this section we propose a scheme for preserving the trajectory privacy of sink 
nodes in mobile wireless sensor networks with mobile sink node(s) and mobile sensor 
nodes. The proposed scheme relies on the random distribution of packets and storing the 
packets in intermediate nodes with a predefined probability. Our scheme does not release 
any address information about the mobile sink node. In addition to these, the scheme does 
not contain any cryptographic mechanism. Since we do not have any extra cryptographic 
mechanism, our scheme is computationally lightweight. 
 
The rest of this section is organized as follows. The network assumptions and threat 
model is explained in Section 3.1. Our proposed approach is detailed in Section 3.2 
 
The notations that are used to describe and analyze the proposed scheme are given 
in Table 1. 
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Table 3.1: List of notations used in Section 3 
   Size of the network area 
   Number of nodes in the network 
   Buffer size of a sensor node. 
   Number of different nodes desired to keep copy of data. 
    Probability of storing a received data. 
        
   second of simulation. 
     Data delivery rate of the network. 
         Number of distinct data packets received by the mobile sink 
          Number of data packets received by the mobile sink 
         The total number of generated data packets by the mobile sensor 
nodes 
         The total number of forwarded data packets by the mobile sensor 
nodes 
   Remaining number of different nodes desired to keep copy of data. 
    Number of different nodes desired by active attacker to keep copy of 
data 
    Data packet generated by a mobile sensor node. 
    The mobile sensor node that forwarded data. 
    Selected mobile sensor node among neighbor nodes to forward data. 
    The mobile sensor node that generates the data. 
    The mobile sensor that received data packet. 
     Ratio of mobile sensor nodes that generates data at same time interval 
    Neighbor list of a mobile sensor node. 
   Probability of sending fake beacon. 
   Predetermined time for broadcasting beacon by mobile sink node. 
   Predetermined time for broadcasting fake beacon by sensor nodes. 
XY Assignment of X to Y. 
S
D
G SS
G     sends    to    
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3.1. Network Assumptions and Threat Model 
In this section, the assumptions of the networks and the abilities of an attacker are 
given. In Section 3.1.1 the general assumptions of the network are explained. Section 
3.1.2 presents the assumptions about the mobile sink node. In Section 3.1.3, the 
assumptions of the mobile sensor nodes are given explained. Finally, Section 3.1.4 
gives the assumption on the abilities of an attacker. 
3.1.1. General Assumptions of the Network 
The network consists of mobile sensor nodes and a mobile sink node. The sensor 
nodes are deployed randomly with uniform distribution. There is a risk of non-delivery 
of a packet in the case the transmission range of holders of the packet does not coincide 
with the trajectory of the mobile sink. Corollary, the time between the generation and 
delivery of a packet may lengthen.  
Since our main focus is on the trajectory privacy of mobile sink node, other security 
issues that can be preserved with cryptography are not taken into consideration. Thus, 
neither private nor public key cryptography is implemented for the data forwarding 
process. 
3.1.2. Assumptions on the Mobile Sink Node 
Mobile sink has a predetermined set of trajectories and travels on one of the 
randomly selected trajectories for one data collection phase. Mobile sink occasionally 
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broadcasts beacon through nearer sensor nodes. Mobile sink has the capability of 
filtering duplicate data packets. 
3.1.3. Assumptions on the Mobile Sensor Nodes 
Each sensor node has the same capability in terms of transmission range, battery 
power, storage and computational power. Each sensor node has a limited transmission 
range for wireless communication and can exchange packets directly with its neighbor 
nodes. Each sensor node has a limited buffer and releases the oldest packet if a new 
packet received or generated and the buffer is full. Even if the packet is delivered to the 
mobile sink, it is not released from the buffer if there is still space in the buffer. The 
sensor nodes that their transmission range falls into location of the mobile sink transfer 
the packets that are stored in their buffer. Each sensor node chooses a random 
destination within its transmission range and moves towards it with a fixed 
predetermined velocity. Each node repeats this process immediately when it reaches 
the destination. 
3.1.4. Assumptions on the Abilities of an Attacker 
An attacker cannot hear the direct communication between the mobile sink and the 
mobile sensor node. This assumption is fair enough since otherwise analytically no 
defense system can maintain the privacy of mobile sink node. With this assumption, 
attacks containing trace routing technique will not be sufficient since the route of a 
packet does not change with the existence of a mobile sink. To strengthen the attacker, 
it is assumed that the attacker would know about the packets with their context that are 
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collected by the mobile sink, as the collection of the data is published in public. With 
this assumption, attacker would also trace route of her own packets and would learn 
about if they are collected and know about which sensor nodes have received her 
packets. An attacker may deploy malicious sensor nodes into the network. Hence, she 
may at least be aware of the time and location of the direct communication of the 
mobile sink with her own malicious sensor nodes. An attacker can capture packets and 
read the contexts of them. Also packet capturing is not an ideal attack technique for an 
attacker since there is no information about mobile sink in the header of packets. 
Precisely, the sensor nodes of the network ignore the location or trajectory of the 
mobile sink. 
3.2. The Proposed Approach 
In this section, the details of the proposed scheme are given. Section 3.2.1 states the 
motivation behind this approach. The general overview of the proposed scheme is 
presented in Section 3.2.2. In Section 3.2.3 storage management is detailed. In Section 
3.2.4 the initial phase of the packet distribution is described. In Section 3.2.5 the 
intermediate phase of the packet distribution is given. Finally, in Section 3.2.6 data 
collection mechanism is explained. 
3.2.1. Motivation 
Although wireless sensor networks promise a wide spectrum of applications that 
cannot be or not easy to be applied by general network schemes, they also bring a wide 
spectrum of new security concerns. Mobile wireless sensor networks is a subdomain of 
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wireless sensor networks and due to the mobile architecture of these networks, even more 
new security issues have emerged that cannot be solved by the approaches developed for 
traditional wireless sensor networks. 
Location privacy of a mobile sink is one of the unique security concerns of mobile 
wireless sensor networks because the sink node is generally assumed to be static in terms 
of physical location in traditional wireless sensor networks. Moreover, the privacy 
techniques [20, 21, 22, 23] related with location privacy in general networks are far away 
from the derivation of the security concern into the architecture of mobile wireless sensor 
networks. Thus, these approaches cannot be applied to MWSNs. In some applications such 
as the owner of mobile sinks are in competition with each other, an attacker may be 
interested in the previous trajectories followed by the mobile sink or the prediction of the 
future trajectories of the mobile sink nodes. In the literature, only a few works exist on 
location privacy of the mobile sink nodes. To the best of our knowledge, no work so far 
published on the topic of the trajectory privacy of mobile sink node.  
Our aim with this thesis is to highlight the problem of trajectory privacy of the 
mobile sink in mobile wireless sensor networks and propose a scheme that maintains the 
trajectory privacy while preserving desirable network property such as high data delivery 
rate. 
3.2.2. Overview of the Scheme 
The proposed scheme is based on homogenous distribution of the data packets by 
random forwarding and random movement of the mobile collector node. Our scheme aims 
to preserve the trajectory privacy of the mobile sink while keeping the data delivery rate 
and communication overhead at acceptable values. A depiction of the network is given in 
Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: MWSN with mobile sink and mobile sensor nodes 
The mobile sink has a predefined set of trajectories. For each collection phase, it 
randomly selects one of them and travels on the selected trajectory with a preset constant 
speed. It broadcasts beacon for every   , predetermined time for broadcasting beacon, to 
let the sensor nodes be aware of its existence. Also each sensor broadcasts fake beacons for 
every   , predetermined time for broadcasting fake beacon, with the probability of   , 
probability of sending fake beacon. The mobile sink has the capability of filtering out 
duplicate data packets. The detailed information about data collection mechanism is given 
in Section 3.2.6. 
Each sensor node has a storage, which is limited with a buffer size,  . Whenever a 
sensor node receives the broadcast message of the mobile sink and if its transmission range 
covers the location of the mobile sink, it forwards all the data packets in its buffer. The 
detailed information for the buffer size of a sensor node, B, and storage management are 
given in Section 3.2.3. 
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When a sensor node generates a data packet, it stores the packet in its buffer and 
distributes the data packet to other   sensor nodes to have them keep a copy of it. If  , 
number of different nodes desired to keep a copy of data, is initialized to zero, the mobile 
sensor nodes in the network will not forward or receive a data packet and will only interact 
with the mobile sink node.  If, for instance,   is set to 10, then the number of copies stored 
for this packet by other sensor nodes in the network will be 10. The detailed information 
for   and the initial phase of the packet distribution are explained in Section 3.2.4. 
If a sensor node receives a packet, it keeps the packet in its buffer with the 
probability    and decrements   , the remaining number of different nodes desired to keep 
a copy of data. With the probability     , the packet is not stored and    is not 
decremented. The received packet is forwarded if    is higher than 0. The detailed 
information about the intermediate phase of the packet distribution is given in Section 
3.2.5.  
3.2.3. Storage Management 
If a sensor node interacts with the mobile sink node and delivers all the data packets 
in its buffer, it does not necessarily clean up the entire buffer.  The reason behind this is 
preventing an attacker to perform a successful attack, which is constructed on combination 
of traffic analysis and node capturing. If all of the storage of a sensor node is cleared with 
the interaction and a high traffic rate is observed on this node lately, the attacker would 
observe the empty storage by capturing this node and can conclude that the mobile sink has 
just passed near to this sensor node and interacted with it. In other words, cleaning up the 
buffer after delivering all of the stored packets helps the attacker to obtain information 
about a part of the trajectory of the mobile sink node. The mobile sink is assumed to have 
the capability of filtering out the duplicated data packets and the next interaction with the 
mobile sink should take some time. These facts encourage this kind of storage management 
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approach to be applied by considering the concern of the trajectory privacy of the mobile 
sink node. 
When a node desires to store a new data packet (either because of generation of the 
data packet or receiving a forwarded data packet) into its buffer, it checks the volume of 
the occupation of its storage and if it is equal to the buffer size of a sensor node,  , it drops 
the oldest packet. The data packet, which stayed longer in the buffer, has a higher 
probability to be already collected by the sink. 
The pseudo-code of storage management of a sensor node is given in Figure 3.2
)(addPacket  
 drop            
 usedSpace if        
Buffer fPacketsIngetNumberO  usedSpace   
 if 
newPacket
Package
B
StoredesiredToBenewPacketD
oldest


 
Figure 3.2: Pseudo-code of storage management 
3.2.4. Initial Phase of the Packet Distribution 
When a sensor node generates data   , it inserts    into its buffer with the storage 
management approach that is mentioned in Section 3.2.3. If  , the predetermined different 
number of sensor nodes desired to keep    in its storage, is higher than 0, then the number 
of different nodes to a keep copy of data,   , is set to the number of different nodes desired 
to keep a copy of data,  . The information of    is attached into the header of data 
packet  . Finally,    is forwarded to   , the selected mobile sensor node among the 
neighbor nodes to forward data. 
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If   is zero, the mobile sensor node stores the generated data packet but does not 
forward it. In other words, the mobile sensor nodes do not interact with each other but 
communication takes place only between the mobile sink and the mobile sensor nodes. The 
pseudo-code of initial phase of the packet distribution is given in Figure 3.3 
ForwardNot       Do          
else          
S       S          
 among NLect S       Sel          
 || LD         D          
L          L          
 if L          
)DaddPacket(          
or node, Sobile sensted by a m is genera DCase: Data
S
D
G
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RGG
R
G
GG
G
  
 
0




 
Figure 3.3: Pseudo-code of Initial Phase of the Packet Distribution 
3.2.5. Intermediate Phase of the Packet Distribution 
 
When an intermediate node receives    from a mobile sensor node   , it stores     
with the predetermined probability value of    in its buffer by applying the storage 
management approach mentioned in Section 3.2.3 and decrements   .    is not 
decremented if the data packet is not stored with the probability     . 
If     favors for storing   , and    is higher than 0, the mobile sensor node selects 
one neighbor node    among     except    and forwards    with possible decremented 
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   attached to the header of   . The pseudo-code of intermediate phase of the packet 
distribution is given in Figure 3.4 
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Figure 3.4: Pseudo-code of Intermediate Phase of the Packet Distribution  
Mobile Sink
Trajectory of 
Mobile Sink
Intermediate Sensor Node that 
keeps the copy of data packet 
and its transmission range
Originator Sensor Node  and 
its transmission range
Intermediate Sensor Node that 
only forwards the data packet 
and its transmission range
 
Figure 3.5: A local view of data distribution with     and        
 
The reason behind not decrementing    when     is not stored, is to maintain a 
homogenous distribution of     in the entire network. By doing so, the delivery probability 
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of    increases because if a mobile sensor node does not have chance to interact with the 
mobile sink node, the closer neighbor nodes may also have no chance to interact. The 
probability of having an interaction with the mobile sink node and at least one of the sensor 
nodes at far and different locations is higher. This situation is illustrated in Figure 3.5 with 
the scenario of     and       . If the intermediate node had decremented   , it was 
not going to forward the data packet anymore and data was not going to be delivered 
because the trajectory of the mobile sink node is not in the transmission range of the 
originator node and the intermediate sensor nodes that stored the data packet.  
3.2.6. Data Collection Mechanism 
Mobile sink broadcasts beacon through nearer sensor nodes for every   , 
predetermined time for broadcasting beacon. In order to hide the existence of the mobile 
sink, each sensor broadcasts fake beacons for every   , predetermined time for 
broadcasting fake beacon, with the probability of   , probability of sending fake beacon. 
Thus, a sensor node cannot differentiate a beacon if it is generated by the mobile sink or by 
any other mobile sensor node. Sensor nodes that received a beacon broadcast packets in the 
buffer without dropping them as mentioned in Section 3.2.3. Mobile sink has the capability 
of filtering out duplicate packets and drops the packets that have been already received 
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4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS 
In this section, a detailed performance evaluation of our scheme is provided using 
both simulation and analytically. Section 4.1 explains the performance metrics and 
analyzed issues. In Section 4.2, simulation environment and setup is explained. Section 4.3 
discusses the simulation and analytical results. 
4.1.  Performance Evaluation Metrics & Analyzed Issues  
We are going to evaluate the performance of our scheme using the following 
metrics and issues. 
Data Delivery Rate (   ):  Since the proposed scheme does not establish a route 
toward the mobile sink nodes, delivery of a data packet is not guaranteed. Thus, delivery 
rate of the generated data packets is one of the main metrics of our performance evaluation 
in order to measure the success of our proposed scheme. The ratio of the number of distinct 
data packets received by the mobile sink over the total number of generated data packets 
by the mobile sensor nodes gives    : 
    
       
       
                      (1) 
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Hiding Ratio: Our threat model proposes that an attacker can deploy her own 
nodes into the network. Thus, hearing a beacon by a malicious node gives information 
about the location of mobile sink node. In order to avoid this situation, our scheme lets 
mobile sensor node to broadcast fake beacons for every   , predetermined time for 
broadcasting fake beacon, with the probability of   , probability of sending fake beacon. 
In this way, a mobile sensor node that receives a beacon cannot differentiate if the beacon 
is generated by the mobile sink or by any other mobile sensor node. We compute the ratio 
of the number of fake beacons heard generated by mobile sensor nodes and total number of 
heard beacons. The average of this ratio yields hiding ratio: 
                   
                             
                             
                  (2) 
Communication Overhead: One of the most important mechanisms of our scheme 
to be successful in terms of     is distributing the generated data packets to the different 
locations of the network. As a side effect of this mechanism, high network traffic is 
expected. Number of copies in the network may increase the probability of deliverance but 
higher number of packet forwarding is required to have more number of copies of a packet. 
Thus, we evaluate the communication overhead in terms of amount of transmissions 
among the mobile sensor nodes and the amount of generated data packets.  
Resilience against Traffic Analysis Attacks: Since the traffic analysis attack is 
one of the most studied attacks for location privacy in WSNs, we analyze different traffic 
rate of the different regions of the network and compare them with each other to measure 
the resilience of our scheme against traffic analysis attacks. 
Resilience against Node Fabrication Attacks: We evaluate the effect of node 
fabrication attacks (An attacker deploy her own sensor node into the network and make 
them participate in the network scheme) by modeling two types of attacks: (i) pure passive 
attack, (ii) active attacks. Details of these attack models are given in Section 4.3.5 and in 
Section 4.3.6 relatively. 
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4.2. Simulation Environment and Setup  
Simulation is implemented using Omnet++ Network Simulation Framework [24] in 
Solaris 10 (SunOS 5.10) using Intel Xeon X5675 3.06 Ghz CPU. In our simulations, 100 
nodes ( ) are uniformly distributed over a field of             . We run the 
simulations for            . A mobile sink enters into the sensor area at        and 
follows a predetermined trajectory which falls out of the simulation area after        . 
Speed of the mobile sink is with     . Mobile sink broadcasts beacon for every   , 
where      . Sensor nodes and sink node have a communication range of         . 
Each sensor node selects a random destination within its transmission range and moves 
towards it with      speed and repeats this process immediately after reaching its 
destination. From       to         , at every 5 seconds, a randomly selected 
predetermined portion of the sensor nodes (   ) generate data packets. From       to 
       , sensor nodes broadcasts beacon for every   , where      . Each set of 
simulation scenarios is performed 10 times and average values are reported to converge the 
randomization. 
4.3. Simulation and Analytical Results 
We perform three basic simulation scenarios with various set of parameter values: 
 Benign network: We have simulated the network without any attack to 
observe the performance of the network under normal circumstances with 
various scheme parameter values. 
 Network under pure passive attack: We have simulated the proposed 
network scheme with malicious nodes which generate a data packet and do 
not forward it. 
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 Network under active attack: We have simulated the network with 
malicious nodes that are also actively participating in the data distribution 
process. 
 
In Section 4.3.1 we give the results for benign network scenario in terms of data 
delivery rate, and discuss about the effects of number of different nodes desired to keep 
copy of data,  , buffer size of a sensor node,   and probability of storing a received data, 
  . Hiding ratio and effects of   , probability of sending fake beacon, on hiding ratio is 
discussed in Section 4.3.2. Communication overhead is analyzed in Section 4.3.3. In 
Section 4.3.4, traffic analysis attack is discussed by observing the traffic rates of the 
network for its different subregions. In Section 4.3.5 the network under pure passive attack 
is analyzed. In Section 4.3.6 the network under active attack is discussed and analyzed. 
Finally, in Section 4.3.7 performance difference of our scheme with the approach studied 
by Ngai et al. in [19] is presented. 
4.3.1. Data Delivery Rate 
Figure 4.1 shows the data delivery rate for various values of   while keeping the 
sensor node’s buffer size   fixed to 10 packets and DGR fixed to 0.15 (i.e. for each 5 
simulation time, a randomly selected 15% of the mobile sensor nodes generate data 
packet). The scenario is processed for benign networks.  
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Figure 4.1: Data Delivery Rate vs.   for benign networks (    ,        and     
    ) 
It is observed that, with the increase of  ,    increases and comes to a saturation 
point between   = 10 and 20. In this setup of simulation, the actual number of generated 
data packets is 1065 (15% of the network generated data packets for each 5 seconds from 
      to        ). In Table 4.1, the actual number of delivered data packets for various   
is given.    starts to decrease after   = 20. For this setup,   = 10 is    is high for   = 10 
as much as   between 10 and 20, but communication overhead increases with the increase 
of   . Thus,   = 10 is the optimum for this simulation configuration. These results conclude 
that   affects the distribution of data packets among the network but after some certain 
point delivered packet amount decreases.  
Table 4.1: Actual number of delivered data packets 
L 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 
#Delivered 187 862 1043 1051 1055 1038 946 904 
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Packets may not be delivered either because there have been no interaction between 
the mobile sink and the sensor nodes that have a copy (undelivered packets), or the packets 
are dropped from the buffer due to buffer overflow (buffer overflowed packets). Figure 4.2 
shows the correlation between undelivered data packets and buffer overflowed data 
packets for the same simulation (Note: values of zeros are depicted as 1 to be able to scale 
the graph logarithmically.) 
 
Figure 4.2: Undelivered vs. Buffer Overflowed Packets for benign networks (    , 
       and         ) 
It is observed that the amount of undelivered data packets decreases significantly 
and converges to 0 for      . In other words, for higher values of  , there is not any data 
packet distributed to a set of mobile sensor nodes that are not interacting with the mobile 
sink node. However, the amount of buffer overflowed data packets are increasing with the 
increase of  .  
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For some MWSNs, the volume of sensed data by sensor nodes would be very high 
and for some others it would be very small. We expect less buffer overflow for networks 
with lower data generation rate,    .     is not a part of the proposed scheme definition, 
but it is a simulation parameter for us to model networks with different rate of data 
generation. For this reason, we have processed simulations with various values of     
while keeping the other network factors fixed (    ,        and     ).  
  
Figure 4.3: Data Delivery Rate vs. DGR for benign networks (    ,        and 
    ). 
Figure 4.3 shows the effect of different values of     on    , data delivery rate. 
Up to the value     = 20%, we have     over 97%. However, at the point DGR = 25%, a 
tremendous decrease on      is observed, which is almost 10 points. The main reason of 
this decrease is the fluctuation of the amount of buffer overflowed packets. Figure 4.4 is 
depicted for the same scenario of Figure 4.3 and it shows the relation between data 
generation rate,    , and the number of packets buffer overflowed. For a limited  , we 
observe that there exists a threshold of     and after passing this threshold, the packets 
start to be dropped due to buffer overflow. For our simulation setup, this threshold happens 
to be around 20%-25%.  
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Figure 4.4: Buffer Overflowed Packets vs.     for benign networks (    ,        
and     ). 
In Figure 4.5, effects of different    values on     is depicted with the fixed 
values     ,      and         . It is observed that     is decreased with 
increase in probability of storage. The observation shows that distribution of the packets 
through the network increases with the decrease of   . However, the acceleration of this 
decrease is low until the value of    = 0.5. Thus,    = 0.5 is optimum for this simulation 
setup. 
 
Figure 4.5: Data Delivery Rate vs.    for benign network (    ,      and     
    ). 
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To sum up, we have three basic parameters ( ,   and   ) for our proposed scheme. 
     increases linearly with respect to the buffer size of a sensor node, B. As it is observed 
in Figure 4.1,     will be less than 20%  if there is only space for the self-generated 
packets in the storage (  = 0). On the other hand, if   was infinite, there would not be any 
buffer overflowed packets. According to Figure 4.2,     would have been 100% in case of 
infinite  . For a certain amount of increase in  , we observe fast convergence of     to 
100%. However, due to the high network traffic and limited  , data delivery rate starts to 
decrease for higher values of  . In another aspect, high network traffic and limited   
increase the number of buffer overflowed packets, which in turn decrease    . 
All these simulations demonstrate that with a fine tuning of the parameters of our 
scheme, it is easy to maintain a high     but these parameter values would differ from 
network to network because every network may have different limitations such as low 
buffer size. Based on the application area, the data generation rate of the networks may 
differ. It may be less for networks to observe geographical properties of an area but it may 
be high for a network that senses radioactivity in a nuclear station. 
4.3.2. Hiding Ratio 
In a scenario where mobile sensor nodes do not broadcast fake beacons, an attacker 
is able to get information about trajectory of mobile sink node via deployed malicious 
nodes. In our scheme, with the integration of fake beacons, the attacker does not know if 
the beacon is generated by the mobile sink node or by any other node. However, if the 
probability of receiving a beacon from the mobile sink node is higher, the attacker can use 
this statistics to reveal the trajectory.  
31 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Hiding Ratio vs.    for benign network (    ,        ,      and 
        ). 
In Figure 4.6, hiding ratio is depicted for different values of   , probability of 
sending fake beacon, with the fixed values     ,        ,      and         . 
Trivially, hiding ratio is 0 for         since any beacon heard by a mobile sensor node 
is generated by the mobile sink. For        , hiding ratio is 0.8 which also proposes 
that on average 20% of the beacons heard by a mobile sensor node is generated by the 
mobile sink node. With the increase of   , hiding ratio increases and converges to 100%.  
The acceleration of the increase in hiding ratio reaches the saturation point at        . 
Thus         is optimum for this simulation setup. 
In Figure 4.7, the ratio of number of  broadcasts of packets in the buffer due to fake 
beacons over number of broadcasts of packets in the buffer due to actual beacons are given 
for the scenario depicted in Figure 4.6. It is observed that as the    increases, number of 
extra broadcasted packets increase linearly. Hiding ratio never reaches to 1.0. That is to 
say, the minimum    that supplies desirable hiding ratio is optimum. For this simulation 
setup         is optimum where hiding ratio is above 0.94. 
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Figure 4.7: Extra Broadcast Factor vs.    for benign network (    ,        ,      
and         ). 
4.3.3. Communication Overhead 
In our scheme, due to the fact that we are interested in distributing the data packets 
among the entire network as much as possible, our approach is directly affected by the 
number of transmissions. The expected number of transmissions for one successful packet 
delivery is 
 
  
. The expected number of forwarded data packets is calculated as follows: 
 [       ]  ∑
 
  
       
    
         
  
        (3) 
It is expected to have 20 transmissions for having 10 nodes with the copy of the 
data packet according to (3).  Figure 4.8 shows the linear relationship between   and the 
total number of forwarded data packets by the mobile sensor nodes,         . It can be 
observed that with the increase of  , the amount of transmissions among the mobile sensor 
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nodes increase linearly, which is expected according to (3).  In Table 4.2,  [       ] and 
actual values of         are given for the simulation scenario depicted in Figure 4.8. 
 
Table 4.2:   [       ]vs.         
   [       ]         
0 0 0 
5 10650 10256 
10 21300 21285 
15 31950 33674 
20 42600 41445 
25 53250 52186 
 
 
Figure 4.8:         vs.   for benign network (    ,        and         ) 
 In Figure 4.9, extra collection factor (the ratio of the number of distinct data packets 
received by the mobile sink to the number of data packets received by the mobile sink) is 
given for various   and for the same scenario depicted in Figure 4.8. It is observed that 
with the increase of L, the number of same packets received for one singe data packet 
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increases. In other words, for one single packet, the mobile sink collects extra data packets 
and has to filter out them. As mentioned in Section 4.3.1, L = 10 is optimum for this 
simulation setup since the extra effort for collection increases where     slowly increases 
for L > 10. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9:                ⁄  vs.   for benign network (B = 10,   =0.5 and DGR = 0.15) 
In conclusion, the parameter setup directly effects the communication overhead in 
the network. Although the simulation results show a linear increase in the traffic rate 
according to the parameter values, we find the increase acceptable. Under normal 
circumstances, there had to be a forwarding mechanism for any scheme because it is not 
feasible for a mobile sink to visit every mobile node in the network. Thus, a certain amount 
of transmissions is expected for any. In our scheme, this communication overhead is 
manageable and can be foreseen. Hence, with the fine tuning of scheme parameters, the 
communication overhead can be maintained while keeping the data transmission rate at 
desirable values. 
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4.3.4. Traffic Analysis Attack 
As mentioned in [8], Traffic Analysis Attack is a powerful technique used by 
attackers for location privacy concerns in WSNs. Thus, most of the approaches for 
preserving privacy location involve a counter-measure for traffic analysis. In our proposed 
scheme, traffic analysis does not yield any useful information for an attacker since our 
scheme’s routing is independent of the location of the mobile sink node. Precisely, mobile 
sensor nodes do not take into account the trajectory of the mobile sink while distributing 
generated data packets. Eventually, even if there is no mobile sink in the network, the 
behavior and consequently the traffic rate of the network do not change. Actually, the 
nature of our scheme produces a network traffic that can be predicted and due to this 
prediction, any abnormal traffic rate information can be used for the security systems. In 
other words, the traffic analysis actually can be used as a security tool for the network. 
To illustrate the deterministic behavior of our scheme in terms of network traffic, 
we divide  , size of the network area, into 25 subregions (       ) and compared 
        per each subregion. See Figure 4.10 for subregions’ illustration. 
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Figure 4.10: Subregions of   
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Analogically, sensor nodes near to the edges of the network have less traffic rate 
and the sensor nodes in the middle of the network have higher rates. In Figure 4.11, surface 
illustration of the network according         of subregions is depicted for the simulation 
scenario with values     ,        ,      and         . It is observed that 
       , the total number of forwarded data packets by the mobile sensor nodes, increases 
from outermost regions to innermost regions. In addition to that, regions in the same layer 
have almost same        . Despite the innermost region has the highest traffic, some of 
the trajectories of the mobile sink do not cover the innermost region sensor nodes’ 
transmission range. Moreover, there is no different traffic rate between the same layer 
subregions where some of them involve the trajectory and some do not. 
 
Figure 4.11: Traffic Illustration Based on Subregions (    ,        ,      and 
        .) 
Because of the deterministic behavior of network traffic for the networks having 
our proposed scheme, observing that two same layer subregions having significantly 
different traffic rates do not conclude about the trajectory of the mobile sink. Actually, this 
kind of abnormality is not expected and may reflect a malicious behavior in the network, 
such as dysfunction of sensors or deployment of malicious sensor nodes into the region. 
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Thus, traffic analysis can be used as a tool for intrusion detection system for our scheme, 
rather than a tool for attackers to expose trajectory of the mobile sink node. 
4.3.5. Network under Pure Passive Attack 
In Pure Passive Attack model, an attacker deploys her own static sensor nodes into 
the network area with her own generated data packets but do not distribute these packets 
through the network. In case of receiving a data packet from other nodes, it is processed 
via proposed scheme principles. 
For pure passive attacks, interaction with the mobile sink gives exact information 
about the location of the mobile sink. In addition to that, no interaction provides the 
information that the location of the malicious node is not part of the trajectory.  
We have processed simulations with various values of     while keeping the other 
network factors fixed (    ,        and     ) and 6 malicious nodes in addition.  
Out of 6 malicious nodes, 2 of them have interacted with the mobile sink node and 
4 of them have not interacted with the mobile sink node.  In other words, the attacker have 
learnt 2 points of the trajectory and learnt that 4 locations do not fall into the trajectory 
while having a network with  5,67% (6 out of 100 + 6) of the sensor nodes are malicious 
We ignore, a wise ignorance in favor of the attacker, the fact that the trajectory also 
contains locations in areas with absence of any mobile sensor nodes and we ignore the time 
dimension of a trajectory. For this analysis, the trajectory is a set of the locations where the 
mobile sink interacted with the mobile sensor nodes. Thus, we conclude that the number of 
locations constructing the trajectory is equal to the number of distinct sensor nodes 
interacted with the mobile sink. Under these extreme assumptions, the least number of 
nodes to be maliciously deployed in the network to learn entire trajectory is equal to the 
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number of the mobile sensor nodes interacted with the mobile sink, say  . The probability 
of selecting a location that falls into the trajectory point is equal to   ⁄ . If learning   
percentage of the trajectory points is assumed to be enough for an attacker to induce the 
rest of the trajectory, the expected number of nodes should be deployed is calculated as 
follows: 
 [  ]  
 
 
                (4) 
So, even if   = 20% is enough to learn the rest of the trajectory, number of the 
nodes should be deployed is the 20% of the total number nodes in the network. In 
conclusion, we have served assumptions in favor of  the attacker such as ignoring the time 
dimension of a trajectory ignoring the locations that are not interacting with any mobile 
sink node. Yet, we concluded that the attacker should deploy an infeasible amount of nodes 
in the network to learn the trajectory of the mobile sink node. Thus, our scheme is resilient 
against pure passive attacks.  
Simulation scenario process for pure passive attack has the same configuration 
setup with the simulations depicted in Figure 4.3. In Figure 4.12, the correlation of 
       , total number of forwarded data packets by the mobile sensor nodes, and data 
generation rate,    , is given for benign networks and networks under pure passive 
attack. It is observed that number of transmissions is almost sam for benign networks and 
networks under pure passive attack.  Pure passive attack does not put an abnormal behavior 
in terms of network traffic rate. Since the attack is passive, the traffic analysis is not 
successful for detecting pure passive attacks. 
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Figure 4.12:         vs.     for Networks under Pure Passive Attack (6 Malicious 
Nodes) and Benign Networks (    ,        and     ) 
 
4.3.6. Network under Active Attack 
In Section 3.1, the assumption is given that the contexts of data packets collected by 
the mobile sink are published in public. With the existence of this assumption, we have 
conducted Active Attack and processed simulations to observe the resilience of the 
proposed scheme in terms of trajectory privacy. In Active Attack model, an attacker 
deploys her own mobile sensor nodes into the network area with her own generated data 
packets. Data packets of the malicious nodes are distributed through the network with 
  , equals to   , number of different nodes desired by active attacker to keep copy of data. 
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In case of malicious nodes receive data packets from other nodes, scheme rules are 
followed (for received packets,   is taken into consideration). The attacker can also trace 
her own packet after forwarding. Thus, she can check possibly modified    values by 
overhearing the forwarded packets during the intermediate phase of the packet distribution 
(See Section 3.2.5 for details of intermediate phase of the packet distribution). By doing so, 
she can learn which other mobile sensor nodes keep a copy of her own data packet. In the 
end, by analyzing the network report that is assumed to be published regularly, she has the 
information about if her packet is collected by the mobile sink. In addition to that, the 
attacker has location information of mobile sensor nodes that have kept a copy of her data 
packet. Precisely, she knows    number of sensor nodes stored her packet and her packet 
has been collected by the mobile sink. 
We have processed simulations with various values of    while keeping the other 
parameters fixed (    ,       ,     and         ) and one malicious node is 
deployed. Figure 4.13, shows the relationship between the total numbers of benign sensor 
nodes participated in the delivery of the malicious node’s data packet and   , the number 
of different nodes desired by active attacker to keep copy of data. Results show that for 
    , the attacker finds out one benign mobile sensor node that has interacted with the 
mobile sink for sure. For      , attacker learns that a portion of out of 10 mobile sensor 
nodes has interacted with the mobile sink node for sure, but she doesn’t know how many 
and which of these nodes have interacted with the mobile sink node. The actual number of 
benign sensor nodes delivered the copy of malicious data to the mobile sink is 5, but the 
attacker does not have this information. 
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Figure 4.13:    vs. Total Number of Benign Nodes Participated in Delivery of Malicious 
Packet for network under active attack with one malicous node (    ,       ,     
and         ) 
In case of the mobile sink interacts at least with one of the sensor nodes among    
sensor nodes, the probability of interaction with the mobile sink for a specific sensor node 
is calculated as follows. 
     
     
                                  (5) 
 
The limit of (5) as     approaches  to infinity is 0.5 as shown below. 
       
     
     
             (6) 
 
 
Expected number of nodes that have interacted with the mobile sink node is given 
below. 
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 [  ]                      (7) 
If an attacker deploys a node with the value of    , she may assume that    ⁄  of 
   nodes have been interacted with the mobile sink node. If we check Figure 4.13, we can 
conclude that the assumption of the attacker holds. For instance, for      , 5 benign 
mobile sensor nodes have interacted with the mobile sink. However, attacker does not 
know which    ⁄  nodes are these nodes.  
In the end, all these derivations are not too much useful information for the 
attacker. First of all, (7) also holds for the network with 100% delivery rate. In a network 
with %100 data delivery rate, a benign node’s packet will be delivered for sure. It is 
assumed that an attacker can overhear and trace route all network traffic between mobile 
sensor nodes. Thus, instead of deploying a malicious node, attacker can just assume that 
the benign node is the node she deployed and use this node for her analysis. That is to say, 
all benign sensor nodes are acting as malicious nodes, as the attacker has the entire 
network with her own nodes and setting    to L. She has all these observations for each 
packet, but cannot find out which of these nodes that have actually interacted with the 
mobile network. On the other hand, mobile sensor nodes do not do anything different 
where all packets are delivered with 100% rate and where no mobile sensor sink node 
traveled around the sensor area, which brings data delivery rate to 0%. Consequently, the 
attacker derives the problem of finding out the trajectory of mobile sink into the problem 
of finding out which    nodes is part of the trajectory. The probability of one mobile 
sensor node to be in the trajectory of the mobile sink is 50%. Thus, our scheme is resilient 
against network under active attack. 
4.3.7. Performance Difference of Our Scheme and Ngai et. al. 
In Figure 4.14, we have compared our proposed scheme with the approach studied by Ngai 
et al. in [19]. The results show that both approaches yield high    , data delivery rate. 
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However, our scheme converges faster since approach of Ngai et al. ignores if a packet 
stored or not stored by an intermediate node and decrements  . Thus, our approach 
achieves desirable     values around      where their approach achieves around 
    . 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Our scheme vs. Ngai et al. in terms of     (    ,        and     
    ) 
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5. CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, we highlight a new type of security challenge for mobile wireless 
sensor networks, the trajectory privacy of mobile collector nodes. To the best of our 
knowledge, there has been no approach proposed in order to maintain the trajectory 
privacy of the mobile collector nodes. We have proposed an abstract network scheme to 
maintain trajectory privacy of mobile sink(s) for mobile wireless sensor networks with 
mobile sink with mobile sensor nodes network architecture. Our scheme is based on 
randomly distributing the data packets among the network without taking account into the 
trajectory privacy of the mobile sink node.  
We have performed simulations and analysis to evaluate the proposes scheme. The 
results show that with fine tuning of scheme parameters, data delivery rate reaches up to 
100%. The network yields a deterministic communication overhead that can be maintained 
at desirable ratios with the configuration of scheme parameters. We have also analyzed our 
scheme against traffic analysis attack and observed that our scheme is resilient to these 
kinds of attacks. On the contrary, it is observed that the traffic analysis can be used as an 
intrusion detection tool due to the deterministic behavior of the network in terms of 
communication overhead. We have proposed two different attack models (pure passive 
attack and active attack) with wise assumptions in favor of attackers and have shown that 
our scheme is also resilient against these types of attack models. 
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